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ECB • Working Paper No 256 • September 2003Abstract This is a survey on the recent game theoretic literature on committee
decision making. We consider theoretical work on the role of (i) strategic voting, (ii)
costly information acquisition, (iii) con°icting interests, and (iv) communication in
committees. Moreover, we review recent experimental evidence on these issues. Our
analysis focuses on the optimal size, composition, and decision rules of committees.
We discuss implications for the design of monetary policy committees.
Keywords: committees, strategic voting, costly information acquisition, monetary
policy committees.
JEL N.: D71, E52.
4 ECB • Working Paper No 256 • September 2003Non technical summary
This is asurvey on the recent game theoreticliteratureon committee decision mak-
ing. This literature has studied rational voter behavior when (i) committee members
do not always reveal their signal about the true state of the world, (ii) committee
members obtain their signal at positive costs, (iii) committee members may have
di®erent objectives and (iv) committee members may exchange views before voting.
These insights are used to give advice on optimal committee design.
The main ¯ndings of this literature can be summarized as follows:
1. When information acquisition is costly, the optimal committee size is ¯nite.
Larger committees yield little incentives for individual information acquisition
and may lead to less informed decisions. The optimal number of committee
members is nonincreasing in information acquisition costs and ceteris paribus
larger if (i) the costs of type I and type II errors are more similar, (ii) the prior
is more di®use and (iii) the signal is less accurate.
2. Even with con°icting interests delegation to one single member may be Pareto
dominated by committee decision-making. When the committee rule is chosen
appropriately, gains from sharing information outweigh distortions from infor-
mation manipulation regardless of the extent of con°icts in the committee. The
reason is that committee procedures are themselves chosen to control strategic
misrepresentation given self-interested behavior.
3. The optimal committee size is always smaller than the ¯rst best level when
there are con°icting interests. The reason is that noisy reports by committee
members with policy biases are not as informative as if there were no incentives
to distort information.
5 ECB • Working Paper No 256 • September 2003erences. Increasing con°icts of interest lead to stronger incentives for strategic
manipulation of private information.
5. Total social surplus may insteadincrease inpreference heterogeneity whenmoral
hazard problems in information gathering severely limit the feasible committee
size.
6. The decision rule has to be adapted to the speci¯c problem at hand. The ma-
jority rule has to be adjusted to the distribution of signals and the initial prior
distribution of states of the world. Unanimity and the absence of communica-
tion lead to biased and undesired decisions in large committees. However, the
introduction of pre-vote communication among committee members may alter
these results. With pre-vote communication the voting rule becomes unimpor-
tant when committee members have identical objectives.
7. Imperfectly aggregating the available information may yield a higher overall
expected utility level than perfectly aggregating the information. The reason
is that imperfect aggregation induces more players to acquire information. The
positive e®ect of this may dominate the negative e®ect of wasting some infor-
mation.
8. Granting a committee independence may enhance the quality of its research.
Incentives for information acquisition in the committee are higher if the com-
mittee can rely on the fact that policy is based on its opinion only. A dependent
committee has little incentives to acquire information and is therefore less likely
to acquire expertise.
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4. Committee decisions may improve if members of a committee have similar pref-
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How docommittees work? And how should they be designed? A recent game theoretic
literature has added useful insights to the theory of committee decision making. The
role of this paper is to provide an overview over the recent developments in this ¯eld
and to relate it to some current debates on the design of committees for international
decision making.
The formal study of committees is old. In his classical contribution Condorcet
(1785) describeda committee as a mechanism that e±ciently aggregates decentralized
information. In his famous jury theorem he argues that (i) increasing the number of
informed committee members raises the probability that an appropriate decision is
made and (ii) the probability of making the appropriate decision will converge to one
as the number of committee members goes to in¯nity.
It is useful to relate the modern literature on committees to Condorcet's early in-
sight. Condorcet's analysis was based on a simple set-up where (i) individuals always
reveal their signal about the true state of the world, (ii) individuals obtaintheir signal
at zero cost, (iii) all individuals have the same objective: to make a correct decision,
and (iv) individuals do not exchange views before voting. In many cases of interest
some (or even all) of these assumptions do not hold. Some voting rules may induce
individuals not to vote in accordance with their own information. When information
acquisition is costly, individuals provide less e®ort in large committees. Con°icting
interests may lead to the misrepresentation of information. And communication may
a®ect individual voting behavior when information is distributed asymmetrically. Re-
cent papers have therefore addressed the issue of committee decision making when
one or more of Condorcet's assumptions do not hold.
In this paper we ¯rst discuss contributions that study the role of strategic voting
in committees (Section 2). Next we look at papers that analyze incentives for infor-
7 ECB • Working Paper No 256 • September 2003mation acquisition (Section 3). We then turn to the role of di®erences in preferences
(Section 4) and after that to pre-vote communication (Section 5). Section 6 brie°y
discusses other theoretical issues. Section 7 summarizes some experimental results on
committee decisions and relates them to the theoretical literature.
Key questions related to committee design are "How large should a committee
be?", "Who should be in a committee?", "What is the optimal decision rule?", and
"What should the delegating body do with the committee's decision?". We will sum-
marize and compare the answers to these questions in Section 8. Finally, we analyze
the consequences that one can draw for the design of monetary policy committees in
Section 9.
2 Strategic voting versus naive voting
Unsatis¯ed with the statistical nature of prior proofs of the Condorcet Jury Theo-
rem, a branch of literature investigates the features of strategic voting from a game
theoretic point of view. In fact, relaxing Condorcet's ¯rst underlying assumption in a
more realistic manner, in that individuals might not always reveal their signal about
the true state of the world, leads to the break-down of his theorem. The reason is
that with such strategic voting, a committee member tends to neglect his own in-
formation, while he tries to deduce other committee members' private information
from their voting behavior. Then, he might either not vote any longer according
to his own private information or even abstain, if he feels less informed and shares
common values with the non-partisan part of the electorate. In unanimity regimes,
it is strategic voting that causes the decision to be negatively biased away from the
socially preferred decision, even if the size if the committee tends to in¯nity.
8 ECB • Working Paper No 256 • September 20032.1 Sincere voting
Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) were among the ¯rst to unsheathe the implicit be-
havioral assumptions that individuals vote 'sincerely', i.e. as amember of a collective,
each individual selects the alternative, he would have selected when voting alone, and
'informatively', i.e. each committee member's decision re°ects the signal he received
before.
The authors start from a simple Bayesian game. A ¯nite set of individuals shares
homogenous preferences for selectingthe better, though in the presence of uncertainty
about the true state of the world not de¯nitely identi¯able, better of two alternatives.
The decision is taken by majority vote without abstentions. When making their
decision, agents take into account a common prior probability in favor of one of
the states of nature and a private signal that they received about the true state of
the world. Austen-Smith and Banks show that it is the structure of individuals'
information that endogenously generates heterogeneous policy preferences. Based on
being pivotal, a rational voter is able to deduce other individuals' private signals and
by incorporating this additional equilibrium information into his decision, he tends to
neglect his own private information. It follows that sincere voting by all individuals
cannot generally be both informative and rational. But then, it is no longer assured
that majorities invariably do better than individuals in selecting the better of two
alternatives. In fact, there is just one exceptional case: Only if the majority rule used
is the optimal method of aggregating individuals' private information, the implicit
and explicit assumptions of the Jury Theorem are satis¯ed. An aggregation rule is
optimal, if and only if, the rule being used, it is rational for each member to vote
informatively if all others do so.
In a second step, the authors allow for variations in the structure of individu-
als' information. Speci¯cally, if the decision makers receive two independent private
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ECB • Working Paper No 256 • September 2003The authors conclude that the information environment crucially a®ects the out-
come andthat therefore, the appropriateness of the useof a majority rule hinges upon
the characteristics of the encountered situation.
2.2 Abstention
In contrast to previous models of voter turnout, which traditionally focus on the
costs and bene¯ts of voting, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996, 1999b) present an
informational explanation for the existence of abstention and roll-o®.
Their model considers the behavior of a ¯nite number of voters with heterogeneous
preferences in a two-candidate (ortwo-alternative) election using plurality rule. There
are three types of voters: two types of partisans, who, regardless of the state of the
world, either prefer the status quo or the proposed alternative, and independents,
who prefer to select the option that matches the true state of the world. After the
state and the set of agents have been chosen, every agent receives private information
about both his type and the probability with which one of the states of nature will be
encountered. While some agents get a useless signal, others receive a perfect signal.
These informed agents are certain about the realization of the state variable, which
a®ects the utility of all voters.
Applying insights from the theory of auctions, the authors show that with private
information and common values less informed voters have an incentive to abstain
rather than to vote for either candidate even though voting is costless and though all
abstainers strictly prefer voting for one candidate over voting for another. In fact,
the uninformed independent voters' reason to cast a vote is to compensate for the
partisans. That is how they maximize the probability that the informed voters decide
the election. Having achieved this compensation, it is optimal to delegate the decision
10 ECB • Working Paper No 256 • September 2003via abstention to more informed voters. Coup¶ e and Noury (2002) even provide some
empirical support for this 'swing voter's curse'. An implication of Feddersen and
Pesendorfer's ¯ndings is that di®erences in information about the di®erent items on
the ballot will make voters abstain on some issues and vote on others. Hence, the
authors also provide an explanation for the existence of roll-o®. Moreover, they go on
to show that even though signi¯cant abstention occurs in large elections, the outcome
of the election is almost always the same as with perfect information.1
2.3 Unanimity
With the minimization of criminal trials' expected wrongful verdict costs being a
common social aim, unanimous jury verdicts were usually seen as a mean to reduce
the probability of convicting aninnocent while increasing the probability ofacquitting
a guilty defendant (see e.g. Klaven and Zeisel (1966) or Adler (1994)). Feddersen and
Pesendorfer (1998, 1999a) were the ¯rst to challenge this basic intuition by taking
into account strategic voting by jurors.
They construct a simple voting game. A jury with a ¯nite number of members
has to decide simultaneously and independently the fate of a defendant. Jurors are
uncertainabout thetruestate, but receiveeither of twopossiblesignals, one indicating
guilt and the other innocence. This signal is private and correct with a certain
probability. A juror believing in the defendant's guilt with a probability higher than
his threshold of reasonable doubt prefers the defendant to be sentenced.
Given any voting rule requiring a ¯xed fraction of votes to condemn, Feddersen
and Pesendorfer are able to explicitly solve for the corresponding unique symmetric,
responsive Bayesian equilibrium. Each juror behaves as if his vote was pivotal. Under
1Fey and Kim (2002) elaborate a correct proof of the ¯rst proposition, which does not require
any alteration of the paper's results.
11 ECB • Working Paper No 256 • September 2003the unanimity rule, this is the case, if all other jurors agree, which reveals additional
information about thetrue state. Such information may overwhelm thejuror's private
assessment of the case and cause him to vote with the others, though being inclined
to vote contrarily. As a result and in opposition to the outcome under naive voting,
even in a large jury, the probability of convicting an innocent defendant must stay
bounded away from zero. The informationaggregationpotential of elections vanishes.
The authors also draw comparisons between the unanimity rule and a wide variety
of special majority verdicts of a size less than unanimity, including simple majority
rule. It turns out that among those voting rules, unanimous jury verdicts may be
least appropriate to track the truth and result in higher probabilities of both kinds
of error, i.e. convicting the innocent and acquitting the guilty. More precisely, a jury
theorem holds for all voting rules other than unanimity. While with an increasing
size of the jury, the probability of making a mistaken judgement goes to zero for all
voting rules, except for unanimity, even the opposite may be the case for unanimity:
the probability of convicting an innocent defendant may even increase with the size of
the jury. Based on an example confronting di®erent voting rules for a ¯xed jury size,
the authors ¯nally conclude that in order to reduce the probability of convicting an
innocent defendant, any other supermajority rule with alarge jury is moreappropriate
than unanimity.2
2However, the authors admit that the degree to which strategic voting and private information
matter in actual juries is crucial for the ultimate outcome and thus at last emerges to be an empirical
question. Beyond that, Coughlan (2000) substantially undermines Feddersen and Pesendorfer's
¯ndings by extending their basic setting to include more realistic features of actual jury trials that
save the unanimity rule in jury decisions. In particular, if a jury faces the risk of a mistrial, i.e.
that no unanimous decision can be reached, or if there is deliberation, i.e. that jury members
communicate their private information before the decision is made, unanimity voting outperforms
majority voting.
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The analysis of strategic voting points out that committees need not yield better
results than individuals. However, this result is based upon ¯xed decision rules which
may no longer be appropriate in larger committees. If decision rules are adjusted
properly, then, the Condorcet Jury theorem still holds. Reasons for limits on com-
mittee size can be found if one drops the rather harsh assumption that information
comes for free in order to study incentives for information acquisition in committee
decisionmaking. Obviously, costly informationacquisition in acommittee constitutes
a public good - it tends to be underprovided. Increasing the number of committee
members reduces incentives for information acquisition. The formal analysis of these
incentives yields di®erent results. Papers in which information acquisition is adiscrete
choice come to the conclusion that larger committees may yield poorer decisions and a
lower social surplus. On the other hand, when information acquisition is continuous,
larger committees may still yield better informed decision making in the aggregate
despite lower incentives for information acquisition. After considering the case for
large and small committees and the conditions under which the optimal outcome can
be reinstalled, we turn to information acquisition incentives that arise from the rela-
tion between the committee and a parent body with limited authorization to revise
the committee's decision.
3.1 Large committees
Martinelli (2002) shows that a large committee may anticipate the right state of
the world with probability close to one, although the committee members do not
know anything about the state of the world ex ante and information acquisition is
costly. This is true if the information cost function satis¯es certain conditions. The
paper's main point is that \rational ignorance" on the part of committee members
13 ECB • Working Paper No 256 • September 2003is consistent with a well-informed committee in the sense of forecasting the correct
s t a t eo ft h ew o r l dw i t hah i g hp r o b a b i l i t y .
However, he uses a quite restrictive framework to come to this conclusion: There
are voters who have to decide on two alternatives A and B, with A being the better
one in state of the world A and B being the better one in state of the world B.
Both states are equally likely ex ante and implementing A (B) in state A is worth as
much as implementing B (A) in state B. Moreover, there are \extremists" among the
voters, who, regardless of the state, either prefer A or B . The ex ante probability
of being a type A extremist is equal to being one of type B. Agents may invest
in information, thereby receiving a signal whose accuracy linearly depends on the
information investment. That is to say that if a voter invests x in information, he
receives a signal which is correct with probability 1=2+x. Theinformation investment
costs follow a strictly convex, twice di®erentiable function.
The timing is as follows: Firstly, nature selects the voter's type which is his private
information. Secondly, voters decide simultaneously and unobservably the quality of
information. Then, voters can either vote for A or B. Majority wins.
Extremists never acquire information and always vote for their preferred alterna-
tive. Because of the symmetric structure, there is no problem with insincere voting
among the moderate voters under majority rule (see Austin-Smith and Banks, 1996).
If marginal information cost at zero information is positive and the number of
voters is large enough, there exists no equilibrium with information acquisition. If
marginal cost is zero at the point of zero information, there exists a unique equilib-
rium in which all moderate voters acquire the same amount of information, in turn
depending on its marginal bene¯t, and in which they vote sincerely.
If the second derivative of the information cost function is also zero at the point
of zero information, the probability of choosing the right decision (in the sense that
alternative X is chosen if the state of the world is X) converges to one as the number
14 ECB • Working Paper No 256 • September 2003of voters goes to in¯nity. If it is positive, but bounded, the probability of choosing
the right alternative converges to some value between 1/2 and 1, depending on the
parameters. If the value of the second derivative converges to in¯nity as information
converges to zero, success probability converges to 1/2 as the number of voters goes
to in¯nity. Moreover, elections become very close as the electorate grows.
The intuition for these results is the following: If information is cheap enough
(¯rst and second derivative being zero at zero information), moderate voters will
acquire some, because they are pivotal with positive probability. The existence of
extremists and the imposed symmetry ensure that the probability of being pivotal
does not fall too fast as the number ofvoters grows. Although information acquisition
of the individual moderate voter goes to zero as the number of voters goes to in¯nity,
it does so slowly enough, to allow for the e®ect of large numbers to kick in. The poor
information of the individual voter does also explain why elections are close in this
set-up. Moreover, this feeds back on information acquisition incentives, since in close
elections the probability of being pivotal is high.
3.2 The case for small committees
In contrast to Martinelli (2002), Mukhopadhaya (1999), Nitzan (2001) and Persico
(2000) show that - due to a free rider problem in information acquisition - a larger
jury may make worse decisions.
A nice and intuitive example is Mukhopadhaya's (1999) two player game with a
perfect signal. Each player may purchase a perfect signal about the state of the world.
Both players share information. The game has two asymmetric pure strategies Nash
equilibria where one of the two jury members acquires the perfect signal. The other
is a mixed strategies equilibrium in which both players buy the signal with a positive
probability. In the case with one single decision maker, the decision maker always
15 ECB • Working Paper No 256 • September 2003decides to buy the signal. Hence, in the mixed strategies equilibrium the probability
of making a correct decision is lower than in the one decision maker case.
Mukhopadhaya's game with an imperfect signal goes as follows: First nature
chooses the true state of the world. Then each agent may decide to invest in the
costly signal. Next, all the jurors pool their information which is possible because
they have a common objective. In the vote they all agree on the decision that has to
be taken.
The game has a symmetric mixed strategies equilibrium. The author shows that
for extreme (high) values of the signal's precision, one juror is more likely to reach
a correct decision than three jurors. The author provides an example where the
probability of making a correct decision is ¯rst increasing and then monotonously
decreasing in the number of jurors.
In a similar setting, Persico (2000) determines the optimal voting mechanism
consisting of the voting rule and the committee size. A voting mechanism has to
aggregate information e±ciently as well as to provide proper incentives to acquire
information.
The underlying questions are: Under what circumstances should majority deter-
mine collective decisions, when is it better to rely on more stringent measures of
consensus? And how large should a group of decision makers be?
Persico designs the optimal voting mechanism by choosing the number of com-
mittee members n and the plurality rule R needed to change the status quo. The
optimal mechanism maximizes agents' expected utility from the collective decision.
Costs enter only insofar that a smaller committee is chosen only if this does not de-
crease expected utility. To solve the induced game, Persico restricts attention to pure
and monotone strategies equilibria of the induced game { more precisely, he is only in-
terested in the most e±cient equilibrium in pure and monotone strategies. Voters are
homogenous and can aggregate information only through their votes, communication
16
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such that the maximum number of agents vote informatively in equilibrium. The
basic trade-o® is that by enlarging the committee (combined with an adjustment
of the voting rule R), the decision becomes more accurate, but voters become less
pivotal such that their information acquisition incentive shrinks. If the committee is
too large, no one will acquire information since the probability of deciding the ¯nal
outcome is too low. Thus, there exists a bound on n.
There exists a bound on R, too: The optimal fraction of votes needed to change
the status quo R=n can never be greater than approximately the accuracy of the
signal. This is true irrespective of agents' preferences, i.e. how much they care about
¯rst and second order mistakes. This implies that large pluralities (in the extreme
unanimity) are optimal only if the information available to committee members is
su±ciently accurate.
As n grows, the optimal decision rule R converges to simplemajority. The optimal
number of committee members is nonincreasing in information acquisition cost and
ceteris paribus larger if (i) the costs of type I and type II errors are more similar, (ii)
the prior is more di®use and (iii) the signal is less accurate.
The above statement, that an increase in committee size decreases the incentives
to acquire information, is only one part of the story. The opposite is true as long
as the optimal plurality rule R=n converges to signal accuracy: Because the optimal
decision rule R itself moves with n (and at half speed of the growth of n, as Persico
shows), it creates an opposite-directed e®ect and an increase in n associated with
a minor increase in R makes the individual voter in fact more pivotal than in the
smaller committee, as long as R=n has not yet reached approximately signal quality.
As R=n converges beyond signal quality to simple majority, both e®ects operate in
the same direction and information acquisition incentives indeed decrease with further
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possible types. If agents' types are observable and preferences su±ciently diverging,
it is optimal to leave the decision to a group of only one type, using the optimal
rule that would be used if these agents were the only ones the mechanism designer is
interested in. There exists no voting rule that incorporates votes of both types such
that all types vote sincerely. If agents' types are unobservable but the number of
agents of each type is common knowledge, again the decision rule of only one group
is used, modi¯ed in a way such that the votes of the other type are \sterilized", i.e.
in equilibrium the other type votes in order to correct the voting rule regardless of
their signal and the type whose decision rule is used votes sincerely.
The author admits that the restriction to pure strategies may be critical, since
allowing some agents playing mixed strategies might indeed lead to superior out-
comes, because pure strategy players get stronger incentives to acquire information.
Moreover, the role of communication is entirely neglected.
3.3 Relation to the delegating authority
Incentives to acquire information do also depend upon the relation between the com-
mittee and the delegating authority. Gilligan and Krehbeil (1987) argue that restric-
tions on the ability of the parent body to amend committee proposals may enhance
the informational role of committees. The model of Gilligan and Krehbeil (1987)
works as follows. There are two players, the °oor and the committee. A policy x has
to be chosen, x is a real number. The desired policy of the °oor is zero, the desired
policy of the committee is larger than zero, however the desired policy of both actors
is a®ected in the same way by a shock. The committee members may acquire costly
information about this shock. The committee reports a bill, after this report the °oor
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after obtaining their report, under the restricted policy it may either accept the bill
or stick to the status quo. Gilligan and Krehbeil show that restrictions on the ability
of the parent body to amend committee proposals may provide the committee with
better incentives to acquire information and may lead to an outcome which is better
both for the parent body and the committee.
4 Con°icting interests
Even if one agrees on the validity of the Condorcet theorem's crucial assumption in
a narrow sense, that making a correct decision is all committee members' common
objective, there is still room for violation if one adopts a broader view and allows
voters to di®er in their preferences. Very di®erent approaches have recently been
developed to study the non-neglectable role of con°icting interests in committees.
In some jury models jurors care di®erently about wrongful acceptance and wrongful
rejection of a hypothesis. Other models focus on the degree of con°icts a®ecting the
incentives to exaggerate reports about the own private information and hence the
e±ciency of committee's decision. Finally, we consider the case of interdependent
member preferences.
4.1 Caring di®erently about mistakes
Gerardi (2000) develops a model of collective decision making where individuals with
heterogeneous preferences (which are private information) have to aggregate private
signals in order to make an informed decision. He shows that any nonunanimous
decision rule is asymptotically e±cient. In large committees, the unanimous rule
almost never leads to the decision for which unanimity is required.
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familiar with from section 2.3: A jury has to decide whether to convict or acquit a
defendant who might be innocent or guilty. Jurors prefer to acquit the innocent and
to convict the guilty. In contrast to the set-up in 2.3, they care di®erently about
convicting the innocent and acquitting the guilty. Ex ante, they have no information
about the guilt or innocence of the defendant, but they receive a private signal which
is correct with probability p. Jurors vote strategically, i.e. they condition their vote
on the event of being pivotal, taking into account other agents' strategies. They are
not allowed to communicate before voting.
Timing is as follows: Nature draws the agents' types according to a commonly
known distribution. Agents learn their private signal and vote. In order to solve the
game, the author restricts attention to symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria in which
players do not use weakly dominated strategies.
There exists no voting rule under which all jurors vote informatively in equilib-
rium. Instead, jurors use cuto® strategies: Up to a certain threshold, which depends
on the encountered type, a juror always votes to convict, up to the next threshold,
he votes informatively and beyond, he always votes to acquit the defendant.
The intuition is the following: \low" types are very concerned about acquitting
the guilty. The information they can infer out of their signal and the event of being
pivotal does not convince them of the defendant's innocence, so they vote to convict
him. The same argument holds for \high" types. They are so concerned about
convicting the innocent, that equilibrium information does not convince them of the
defendant's guilt. Medium types are convinced by their signal and use it for their
decision.
A symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists for any decision rule and any jury
size. Under unanimity, the probability that an innocent is convicted converges to zero
as the jury size grows to in¯nity, but the probability to acquit the guilty converges
20 ECB • Working Paper No 256 • September 2003to one. Thus, protecting the innocent comes at the prize of acquitting the guilty.
Moreover, the probability of a convicted defendant being innocent converges to zero.
Under any nonunanimous rule, which is de¯ned as a fraction of voters required to
convict the defendant, the probability to convict the innocent as well as the probability
to acquit the guilty converge to zero.
The author does not develop an optimal voting mechanism, his main points are
that unanimity is not optimal in large juries, whereas nonunanimous rules are asymp-
totically e±cient. The ¯rst result is not that surprising, since the existence of a single
voter with su±ciently extreme preferences su±ces to free the guilty. As the jury size
converges to in¯nity, the existence of such a voter will be very likely, even though
evidence of guilt, on its part inferred out of being pivotal, becomes stronger.
On the other hand, nonunanimous rules, characterized by a fraction of votes re-
quiredto convict thedefendant, have di®erent asymptotic properties. Takeany super-
majority rule. As the jury size becomes larger, the number of \acquit-votes" needed
to acquit the defendant grows and, at the same time, the interval of types always
voting to acquit shrinks, since the evidence of the defendant's guilt becomes stronger.
So, the asymptotic e±ciency of the nonunanimous rule is not surprising either.
To sum up, Gerardi's results strengthen the ¯ndings of Feddersen and Pesendorfer
(1998, 1999a) about the ine±ciency of unanimity.
4.2 Binary decisions and continuous information
Li, Rosen, and Suen (2001) analyze small-committee decisions when members have
partially con°icting interests and possess private information. Private information is
a continuous variable and con°icting interests concern ¯rstand second order mistakes.
Preferences are common knowledge. Their main result is that information cannot be
fully shared and voting procedures arise as the equilibrium method of information
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ECB • Working Paper No 256 • September 2003A committee must choose between two alternatives. Each member receives a pri-
vate observation (a real number). Since information is private, committee decisions
are made on the basis of members' reports of their private data. The authors show
that under these circumstances, information cannot be fully shared among committee
members in the sensethat it is not possibleto exactly conclude from reports onprivate
signals. E±cient (or full) sharing requires that the committee decision responds to
small changes in any members' data. This property fails in any Bayesian equilibrium
of any decision-making procedure. Incentive compatibility implies that continuous
data observed by each member are partitioned and transformed into rank order cate-
gories. In equilibrium, personal thresholds are chosen to undo the presumed biases of
other committee members, but not by enough to completely nullify the information of
the others. The coarsening of information balances incentives to exaggerate informa-
tion and incentives to share information. Nevertheless, incentives for manipulation
and countermanipulation generate a larger area of disagreement among committee
members than is implied by their inherent con°icts in preferences.
It is shown that the greater the latent consensus among members, the greater are
the opportunities for presenting private data in ¯ner categories. On the other hand,
con°icting interests among committee members impose an upper bound on how ¯ne
information partitions can be. Indeed, the quality of committee decisions improves
with the degree of consensus.
The authors demonstrate that delegation to one single member is Pareto dom-
inated by committee decision-making. When the committee rule is chosen appro-
priately, gains from sharing information outweigh distortions from information ma-
nipulation regardless of the extent of con°icts in the committee. The reason is that
committee members are more cautious in casting the decisive vote as if they were
to make the decision alone in order to take advantage of the other members' data.
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decisive votes less frequently.
The coarsening of information implies that the committee decision rule is ex post
ine±cient - but that's the best we can get.
4.3 Committee size with con°icting preferences
Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997) analyze the performance of elections with het-
erogeneous voters when there is uncertainty about a one-dimensional state variable.
Despite heterogeneity and a vanishing fraction of informatively voting agents, elec-
tions perform well. The authors show that the information environment is crucial in
determining the e®ectiveness of elections as information aggregation mechanisms.
There is a two-candidate election in which a population of voters has, costlessly
and by a givenmajority rule q, to decidebetween an incumbent and a challenger. The
challenger wins if he receives a fraction q of votes. Each voter's payo® depends on
his speci¯c preference type, the true state of nature that is common to all voters and
the winning alternative. Preference types are drawn independently from a commonly
known distribution. Each voter knows his own preference type but does not know
the other voters' types. Every voter receives a private signal that is correlated with
the true state of nature.
Thus, in taking a decision, two things matter: the information a voter can infer
about the state of nature, and his preferences. In equilibrium, preference types can
be divided into three groups: those who always vote for either alternative and those
who take informative action, i.e. who make their vote depending on their private
signal.
As the size of the electorate goes to in¯nity, the fraction of players who condition
their votes on their private information goes to zero. Nevertheless, voting fully ag-
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elected that would have been chosen if all private information was common knowl-
edge (the q-median's preferred outcome). Moreover, with probability close to one, in
equilibrium a candidate receives a fraction of votes close to the fraction necessary to
win the election.
The intuition forthe results is the following: Voters condition their voting strategy
on the event of being pivotal. This implies that beliefs about the state of nature
concentrate on the state in which, given the equilibrium strategy pro¯le, it is most
likely that the challenger receives a fraction of votes q. As the voting population
grows to in¯nity, this evidence becomes very strong and the fraction of voters who
still use their signal to update their beliefs goes to zero. Voters behave as if they for
sure were in the predicted state. Although the fraction of voters taking informative
action goes to zero, the number of them goes to in¯nity. Since these are the voters
who determine the outcome of the election, the election performs very well.
However, if besides the uncertainty about the state variable, there is another
source of uncertainty, e.g. concerning the distribution of preferences, or if the payo®
relevant uncertainty is of higher dimension, an election will generally not satisfy
full information equivalence and the fraction of voters who take informative action
does not converge to zero. The reason is that the beliefs about the state of nature
conditional on being pivotal do not converge to a degenerate distribution. In the
light of the importance of the dimensionality of uncertainty for the performance of
elections, the authors encourage a profound analysis of the events preceding elections,
such as nominating procedures, campaigns and polls.
Taking costly information acquisition into account, Cai (2001) develops a model of
committee size when agents are uncertain (i) about the state of the world (which is a
point on the real line) on which the outcome of a continuous policy decision depends
and (ii) about their own policy preferences. When exerting nonveri¯able e®ort, an
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world. Thus, con°icting interests among committee members arise from information
acquisition in this model.
N agents are selected into acommittee by aprincipal whorepresents society's pref-
erences in the sense that his policy preference coincides with an uninformed agent's
expected preference. The committee members' task is to acquire information and
to report it to the principal who uses it to update his beliefs about the state of the
world and then decides upon the policy variable. Updated beliefs and incentive com-
patibility conditions for committee members constitute the elements for a Perfect
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium of this multiple stage incomplete information game for a
given committee size N.
Information acquisition is costly and unobservable. Since information is soft and
informed committee members know their policy preference which may di®er from the
principal's, there exist incentives for strategic information manipulation.
The game is solved by backward induction.
First, the author characterizes a reporting equilibrium of the information aggrega-
tion stage. Attention is restricted to strictly monotonic (reversible) reporting strate-
gies. In this equilibrium, committee members convey all their information (except
their policy preferences) to the principal. Committee members with no policy biases
report truthfully, and those with policy biases exaggerate by a multiple of their pol-
icy preference. Uninformed committee members prefer not tosubmit any information
at all, because their expected policy preference coincides with the principal's and a
signal announcement would only create additional noise.
The principal makes his decision as the (to exaggeration adjusted) mean of all
reports. The author shows that this equilibrium is essentially the unique equilibrium
consisting of reversible reporting strategies, essentially unique in the sense that all
fully reversible equilibria have identical outcomes. Moreover, he proves that it is the
25 ECB • Working Paper No 256 • September 2003most e±cient among all equilibria. Given this reporting equilibrium, the committee
members' incentives togatherinformationandtheoptimal committeesizeare studied.
Information acquisition incentives limit the size of the committee. The optimal
number of committee members is lower than the ¯rst best, i.e. if no incentive prob-
lems would exist and any expected gain from additional information is traded o®
against participation costs. Heterogeneity of preferences plays the crucial role: If
preferences were identical among all agents and information acquisition costs did not
exceed participation costs, the ¯rst best would be attainable since interests would be
completely aligned.
Interestingly, information acquisition incentives and therewith committee size may
increase in preference heterogeneity. Bene¯ts from information acquisition contain
two elements: ¯rstly, the policy becomes more informative and secondly, the agent
learns his policy preference and gets the chance to manipulate the policy in his own
favor. Information acquisition serves as an insurance against preference uncertainty.
When information acquisition costs are high, such that the committee size is limited
by members' shirking tendency, an increase in preference heterogeneity raises the
value of that insurance and mitigates the shirking problem.
4.4 Decision rules with interdependent preferences
GrÄ uner and Kiel (2003) analyze collective decision problems in which individual bliss
points are correlated but not identical. The authors compare the performance of two
speci¯c decision mechanisms as regards di®erent degrees of correlation.
In order to take a common decision, all agents obtain private information about
their most desired policy, but the individually preferred decision of a group member
does not only depend on his own private information but also on the other group
members' private information. Decision problems are characterized by a parameter
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speci¯cation includes the private values case for the lower bound of the interdepen-
dency parameter and the common values case for its upper bound.
Participation in the decision is not voluntary and monetary transfers are excluded
a priori. Instead, the mechanisms map individual announcements of the private in-
formation into the collective decision. Attention is restricted to two speci¯c decision
mechanisms, the median and the mean mechanism. The main di®erence between
these two mechanisms is how they deal with the announcements of private informa-
tion. Under the median mechanism changes in extreme positions are disregarded,
since the median alone determines the ¯nal decision. On the contrary, the nature
of the mean mechanism is to take all available information into account. Therefore,
under the mean mechanism extreme positions in°uence the decision.
The main result of this paper is the identi¯cation of two symmetric Bayesian Nash
equilibria of the respective games. The performance of the mechanisms depends upon
the extent to which spillover e®ects a®ect the economy. With weak interdependen-
cies, the median mechanism dominates the mean mechanism, whereas with strong
interdependencies it is optimal to use the average as decision mechanism.
If individual preferences are strongly correlated, then making all agents partici-
pate in the decision is better than restricting entry into the decision process. If there
is only a small common component then it is better to use the median mechanism.
The intuition is that for weak interdependencies the equilibrium strategy under the
median mechanism implies announcement behavior close to truth-telling whereas the
equilibrium strategy under the mean mechanism leads to strong exaggeration of pri-
vate information. Therefore, average taking is outperformed by ignoring some of the
information available. Since the degree to which interdependencies in°uence untruth-
ful announcement behavior is stronger under the mean mechanism, this intuition
holds for a wide range of interdependencies, only for very high degrees it is reversed.
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authors abstract from individual rationality considerations. However, if participation
constraints are taken into account, even individuals not participating in the mech-
anism would be a®ected by the common decision due to interdependent valuations.
This would imply endogenizing the participation constraint. Secondly, in a setting
with interdependencies there may be scope for pre-vote communication. The question
is if an improvement upon the equilibria of the original game is possible when people
are allowed to communicate before they have to vote. It is well known that equilib-
rium behavior can be a®ected if agents have the opportunity to exchange information
prior to playing some game. Finally, another question is the design of an optimal
mechanism for the class of collective decision problems studied. This would mean to
¯nd a mechanism that implements the welfare maximizing decision for all degrees of
spillovers, not only for the maximum amount.
5 Communication
The models that we have discussed so far rely upon Condorcet's original assumption
that individuals in a committee do not communicate before they cast their votes.
Some people might argue that this whole branch of literature bears useless results
when extensive discussion and exchange of information precedes the votes, hence re-
ducing incentives for strategic voting µ a la Austen-Smith and Banks (1996). Recent
theoretical work indeed provesthat pre-vote communication gives riseto a new kind of
equilibrium, since ¯rst-stage mutual pre-vote revelation of impressions about the true
state of the world replaces the need for committee members to augment private infor-
mation by deducing other members' information from their voting behavior. Then, in
a second stage, i.e. the voting stage, all voters agree on the preferred alternative: the
one that matches the state of the world with highest probability given the signal vec-
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given the second stage voting behavior and given truthful revelation, it is optimal to
reveal the own information truthfully in the ¯rst stage.
One might be tempted to argue that - because in reality communication actually
takes place in committees - the so far surveyed branch of literature is completely
useless. From our point of view, this re°ects an often too idealistic perception of
reality. As we shall see, strategic voting plays a role when committee members have
private information about their preferences - even if communication takes place prior
to voting (Doraszelski et al. (2002)) . This crucially highlights the necessity to
explicitly model the various temptations that committee members might be exposed
to and their respective e®ects on the ¯nal voting outcome. Hence, the previously
reviewed literature at least helps to enhance peoples' sensibleness.
In this section, we review the (small) literature on pre-vote communication in col-
lective decision making, resulting in signi¯cant alterations of the results of previously
discussed committee voting models. After having presented how Gerardi and Yariv
(2002) derive the irrelevance of voting rules for the equilibrium outcome ensued from
pre-vote communication and costless information, we further follow them to demon-
strate the need for a limited optimal committee size when information becomes costly.
Moreover, Doraszelski et al. (2002) show that pre-vote exchange of views improves
the decision in the presence of con°icting interests.
5.1 Irrelevance of voting rules
Gerardi and Yariv (2002) consider a voting game where committee members may
communicate before they cast their votes. The paper contains two models. In the
¯rst model, the role of communication is studied in a set-up where individuals obtain
their information without investing e®ort. In the ¯rst stage, each individual obtains a
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- which may take two values - and of the vector of signals. In the second stage, the
cheap talk stage, individuals may communicate. In the third stage, individuals cast
their votes. The voting rule maps the vector of votes into the set of outcomes. The
voting rule is characterized by the number of votes required to implement a certain
decision. The main result of the ¯rst part of this paper is that with cheap talk, the
set of equilibrium outcomes is independent of the voting rule. As we have seen above,
this is not the case in models without cheap talk.
5.2 Imperfect aggregation and incentives
In the second model, Gerardi and Yariv (2002) consider a game of costly information
acquisition. There is a true state of the world which may take two values. Individuals
share the common objective that the decision should be the appropriate one for the
given state of the world. Each individual may purchase a signal which is correlated
with the true state of the world. Again, the model has three stages. In the ¯rst
stage, the designer chooses an extended mechanism which consists of the size of the
committee, the voting rule and the rule that speci¯es how the players can exchange
messages before voting. In the second stage, the agents observe the mechanism and
decide whether to purchase the signal. These choices are made simultaneously. In
the third stage, members of the committee communicate according to the prespeci¯ed
rules and vote.
The main results are the following ones: First, the authors show that the opti-
mal committee is of bounded size - as before. Second, they show that imperfectly
aggregating the available information may yield a higher overall expected utility level
than perfectly aggregating the information. The reason is that imperfect aggrega-
tion induces more players to acquire information. The positive incentive e®ect may
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Doraszelski et al. (2002) also analyze a voting game which includes a communication
stage prior to voting. They consider a two person committee which has to decide
whether to change the status quo or not. The status quo is optimal in one state
of the world, changing it in the other one. Agents care di®erently about ¯rst and
second order mistakes - hence there are con°icting interests in the committee. These
preferences are the agents' private information.
The game proceeds as follows: Nature draws the agents' types independently
according, to a commonly known distribution. Agents receive a signal which is cor-
related with the true state. In the "one sender" version of the game, one of the
agents sends a message to the other one, in the two sender game both agents send
messages to each other. Both agents vote simultaneously and the collective decision
is implemented. The status quo is maintained unless both vote in favor of changing
it.
The authors look for Perfect Bayesian Equilibria with the additional requirement
that agents do not use weakly dominated strategies. In order to explore the interac-
tion of communication and voting, they restrict attention to responsive robust cuto®
equilibria, i.e. equilibrium strategies that imply that the receiver and the sender con-
dition their votes on their types, their signals and the sender's message. The authors
provide a complete characterization of these equilibria and show that communication
is bene¯cial. Communication's main purpose is to serve as a \double-check": If a
player's information con°icts with his preferences, he uses the submitted information
of the other player to con¯rm his own.
In the "one sender" game in which agents possess information of di®erent quality,
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observing the signal the better-informed sender conditions the message decision on
an event that has the same probability as the event on which the better-informed
receiver conditions the voting decision after observing the message and the signal.
The authors conclude that communication and voting are perfect substitutes in the
sense that informationnottransmittedin the communicationphase will be aggregated
in the voting stage.
T h ea u t h o r sc o m p u t ee xa n t eu t i l i t i e sf o rt h ep u r ev o t i n gg a m e ,t h eo n es e n d e r
and the two sender game for a uniform type distribution. Agents' ex ante utility is
larger with two senders than with one sender. And it is larger with one sender than
with no sender. However, this is due to decreasing returns to scale.
Since adding communication complicates the analysis considerably, the authors
concentrate on a framework with two players, two states and two signals. So, there is
scope for future research to generalize this set-up. For example, adding players would
allow to compare di®erent voting rules.
6 Decision skills
It is not surprising, that the distribution and quality of decision skills also matter for
committeevoting. Two papers that have dealt with di®erent decision skills are Nitzan
and Paroush (1982) and Karotkin and Nitzan (1995). Nitzan and Paroush (1982)
show that with di®erent decision skills the optimal decision rule is a voting rule that
grants more weight to better quali¯ed decision makers. However, one should expect
that pre-vote communication makes weighting unnecessary in some cases. Karotkin
and Nitzan (1995) show that a more egalitarian distribution of decision skills may
justify a reduction of the number of individuals who participate actively in a decision.
32 ECB • Working Paper No 256 • September 20037 Experimental results
Experimental work seeks to elucidate the generality of various theoretical results.
Guarnaschelli, McKelvey and Palfrey (2000) provide a ¯rst experimental study of
jury decision making. The experimental set-up is identical to the one described in
models of voting under imperfect information such as the ones by Austen-Smith and
Banks (1996) or Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998, 1999a). Individuals were informed
about the existence of a true state of nature and they were given a signal with known
stochastic properties. This set-up is used to test for the presence of strategic voting.
It turns out that individuals indeed vote strategically.
In addition, the authors conducted a so-called straw poll experiment. In this
experiment, individuals were asked for the simultaneous announcement of a signal
after which the vote takes place. There is an equilibrium of this game where all
individuals announce their signal correctly in the ¯rst round and then place identical
votes in the second round. It turned out that over 90 % of the individuals revealed
their signal in the ¯rst round. In the second round, about 84 % or more voters voted
in a way consistent with the outcome of the ¯rst round. Voting with a straw poll
improves results in one respect: The probability of one type of error was reduced
while the other was not a®ected.
There are other results in the paper by Guarnaschelli et al. which are at odds
with theoretical predictions. For example, inconsistent with the theoretical ¯ndings
of Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1999a), in an experiment with unanimity rule, the
probability of convicting an innocent defendant declines with jury size.
The authors also ¯nd that voting behavior might be consistent with jury members
playing a mixed strategies equilibrium. Actually, the Austen-Smith and Banks (1996)
game has mixed strategies equilibria: Whereas some individuals vote sincerely, others
always vote to convict and others mix. It should be noted that in this experiment
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all individuals. Individuals received 50 US cents if the group decision was correct and
¯ve cents if it was incorrect.
Blinder and Morgan (2000) present experimental research on the quality of group
decision making. The set-up of their basic experiment is the following: Individuals (or
groups of individuals) are confronted with the result of a binary lottery. The lottery
has an initial probability of 50 % for both possible states. The individuals were told
that the probabilities would change at some randomly selected point of time during
the experiment. The change would either go up to 70 % or down to 30 % for each
of the events. The individuals were asked for a guess of the point of time when the
random process was changed. They were punished for a decision that has been made
too late and they received a reward for a decision that was correct.
Group members were presented exactly the same information as an individual
decision maker: the outcome of the random draw. The ¯rst hypothesis that has been
tested was that groups make decisions more slowly than single individuals. However,
the hypothesis that the decision takes as much time in a group as individual decision
making could not be rejected. The hypothesis that groups outperformindividuals was
instead strongly supported by the experimental data. The third hypothesis concerned
the speed of group decisions with di®erent decision rules. The authors compared
majority and unanimity rule. It turned out that unanimity rule worked faster than
majority rule. Moreover, under majority rule individuals tended to reach unanimous
agreements.
The experimental results by Blinder and Morgan are very useful because they
show that a group may indeed perform better than individuals in analyzing the same
information set (the series of random draws). The fact that decisions do not seem to
take more time when a group decides under unanimity rule is somewhat surprising.
Further theoretical and experimental research on the issue of timing might help to
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Actually, it is needless to say that the applicability of the theoretical results to the
real world depends on the speci¯c features of an encountered situation. As one will
realistically expect to face e.g. a combination of the Condorcet Jury Theorem's
underlying assumptions to be violated to various degrees or further complications,
the results derived in this literature can only serve as a rough, but sound guideline.
Nevertheless, the review of this literature allows drawing some general conclusions
on the optimal organization of committees. These insights will guide our discussion of
actual committee decision making concerning the optimal size, composition, decision
rule, and the special implications for MPCs. Figure 1 illustrates the main results con-
cerning the most important features of committees: decision rule and committee size.
We include results for unanimity in this illustration, because this is a decision rule
of special interest for real-life decision making (e.g. in jury trials) and has therefore
gained special interest in theory as well.
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8.1 How large should a committee be?
The optimal size of a committee depends upon several issues. First, it plays an impor-
tant role, whether the degree of individual informedness is exogenous or endogenous.
In Condorcet's ideal world information is exogenous, i.e. individuals do not need to
invest costly e®ort in order to obtain information. In such a set-up, large committees
always lead to better results. Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) con¯rm this result
when the majority rule is adjusted properly to the degree of informedness and the
prior distribution of the di®erent states of the world. Insincere voting is not a problem
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boundedWhen information acquisition is costly, the optimal committee size is ¯nite. This
result is derived in Mukhopadhaya (1999), Nitzan (2001), and Persico (2000). Ac-
cording toPersico (2000), the optimal number of committee members is nonincreasing
in information acquisition costs and ceteris paribus larger if (i)t h ec o s t so ft y p eI
and type II errors are more similar, (ii) the prior is more di®use and (iii) the signal
is less accurate.
Note that the experimental results in Blinder and Morgan (2000) are not incon-
sistent with these theoretical ¯ndings, since theory also predicts that the quality of
the decision initially increases in the number of committee members.
In a set-up with con°icting interests, Li, Rosen and Suen (2001) demonstrate that
delegation to one single member is Pareto dominated by committee decision-making.
When the committeeruleis chosen appropriately, gains from sharinginformation out-
weigh distortions from information manipulation regardless of the extent of con°icts
in the committee. The reason is that committee procedures are themselves chosen to
control strategic misrepresentation given self-interested behavior.
According to Cai (2001), the optimal committee size is always smaller than the
¯rst best level when there are con°icting interests. The reason is that noisy reports
by committee members with policy biases are not as informative as if there were no
incentives to distort information. Optimal committee size can decrease or increase in
the heterogeneityof committeemembers' policy preferencesdepending oninformation
and participation costs. When information costs are so high that committee size is
constrained by members' shirking tendency in gathering information, then a large
committee can be functional. Moreover, in that case total social surplus can increase
in preference heterogeneity.
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According to Li, Rosen and Suen (2001), committee decisions improve if members
of a committee have similar preferences. With increasing con°icts of interest, the
area of disagreement becomes larger. This, in turn, leads to stronger incentives for
strategic manipulation of private information and thus to an increase in expected
costs (decrease in surplus).
Contrary to this result, Cai (2001) shows that - once there are con°icting in-
terests among committee members - total social surplus may increase in preference
heterogeneity. This can happen when moral hazard problems in information gather-
ing severely limit the feasible committee size. Recall that information acquisition has
two components in Cai's model: ¯rstly, agents receive a signal about the state of the
world and secondly, they become aware of their own preferences. In this model, two
opposing e®ects are present: Heterogeneity in preferences has a direct negative e®ect
on total social surplus, because it increases the noisiness of collective decisions. This
e®ect is comparable to the one in Li, Rosen andSuen (2001). On the other hand, het-
erogeneity here provides additional incentives to gather information, since members
with any policy biases can always manipulate policy in their ideal way. Thus, when
the positive participation e®ect dominates the negative noisiness e®ect, increasing
heterogeneity can increase total social surplus.
With regard to the quality of signals, committeedecisions improve with thequality
of individual information. This e®ect canbe observed e.g. in the setting ofCai (2001):
For a ¯xed committee size, more precise signals always improve the quality of policy
decisions, thereby increasing total social surplus. When one committee member gains
access to data of higher quality in the setting used by Li, Rosen and Suen (2001),
then the other member takes advantage of the improved information by changing
his voting threshold in order to defer the decision to the informed member. Thus,
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it is irrelevant whether it is the sender or the receiver of information who has data of
higher quality (Doraszelksi et al. (2002)).
8.3 What is the optimal decision rule?
This survey of the game theoretic literature on committee decision making has made
clear that thedecisionrule has tobeadapted to the speci¯c problem at hand. Austen-
Smith and Banks (1996) have shown that the majority rule has to be adjusted to
the distribution of signals and the initial prior distribution of states of the world.
According to Persico (2000), the optimal decision rule converges to simple majority
as the number of jury members grows.
According to Gerardi (2000), unanimity and the absence ofcommunication lead to
biased and undesired decisions in large committees. Under unanimity, the probability
that an innocent is convicted converges to zero as jury size grows to in¯nity, but the
probability to acquit the guilty converges to one. So, protecting the innocent comes
at the prize of acquitting the guilty. Moreover, the probability that a convicted
defendant is innocent converges to zero. Under any nonunanimous rule, which is
de¯ned as a fraction of votes required to convict the defendant, the probability to
convict the innocent as well the probability to acquit the guilty converge to zero.
The introduction of pre-vote communication among committee members alters
some of these results. Gerardi and Yariv (2000) show that if pre-vote communica-
tion is introduced into the Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) setting, the voting rule
becomes unimportant. Doraszelski, Gerardi and Squintani (2002) show that even
when agents have partially con°icting interests, voting outcomes improve when pre-
vote communication is allowed. Moreover, it is irrelevant if it is the better or the
worse informed agent who sends a message prior to voting. The authors conclude
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information not transmitted in the communication phase will be aggregated in the
voting stage.
Gerardi and Yariv (2000) show that imperfectly aggregating the available infor-
mation may yield a higher overall expected utility level than perfectly aggregating
the information. The reason is that imperfect aggregation induces more players to
acquire information. The positive e®ect of this may dominate the negative e®ect
of wasting some information. However, imperfect aggregation mechanisms face a
time-consistency problem. At the stage where the decision is to be made, committee
members may agree not to stick to the decision procedure and to aggregate informa-
tion e±ciently. The use of imperfect mechanisms necessitates the ability to stick to
the procedure.
9 Implications for Monetary Policy Committees
We conclude with a discussion of the implications of the game theoretic literature on
committee decision making for the design of monetary policy committees. What are
the conclusions that monetary policy makers may draw from this new game theoretic
literature?
Some of the theoretical results that we have surveyed so far, do not seem to
perfectly relate to the institutional set up which governs actual monetary policy
decisions. One may just think of the literature that studies strategic voting in a
set up where there is no communication among committee members. In monetary
policy committees communication certainly plays a major role. One may therefore
have doubts that the suggestions for the adjustments of decision rules which arise
from strategic voting models should be used to guide the design of monetary policy
institutions and of their voting rules. Nevertheless some useful insights may be drawn
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Monetary policy decisions areoften madeby committees and not by single individuals.
The game theoreticliterature that followsCondorcet's seminalanalysismakes a strong
case for decision making in committees. Delegation of monetary policy to a single
decision maker can only be a boundary solution.
Recently, Gerlach-Kristen (2002)has formallyelaborated on MPC decision making
and provided some additional insights. She studies interest rate setting in monetary
policy committees and addresses three main topics: the advantages of committee
decisions over decisions by a single policy maker in the presence of uncertainty, the
performance of three alternative decision procedures in such committees, and the
reaction of the economy to shocks under these di®erent decision procedures.
In the paper it is assumed that there is uncertainty about potential output, so
that policy makers must form views about the state of the economy in order to set
interest rates. If there was no uncertainty, policy makers could implement the optimal
decision irrespective of the chosen procedure, since they share a common objective.
Therefore, the ¯rst result of the paper, namely that it is preferable for monetary
policy to be determined by a committee instead of a single policy maker if there is
uncertainty about the state of the economy, is a direct application of the Condorcet
Jury Theorem: the larger the committee, the better the decision.
Three di®erent decision making procedures (the mathematically optimal proce-
dure, averaging (mean) and voting (median)) are compared with respect to how
much monetary policy conducted under uncertainty departs from that under full in-
formation. The author shows that if all members are equally skilled (in the sense
that their observation errors have the same variance), averaging coincides with the
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the decision is based on a broader information set, whereas under voting the policy
is determined solely by the median voter's observation.
When committee members di®er in abilities, voting may perform better than av-
eraging. The performance depends on the degree of skill di®erence (only two di®erent
types are possible) and on the number of less able policy makers in the committee.
The intuition is that in this case theoptimal weights attached to the observations vary
between committee members. Voting, by giving zero weight to all but the median
voter's observation, is robust against di®erences in skills, whereas averaging attaches
equal weight toall members' observations. Using simulations Gerlach-Kristen demon-
strates that not employing the optimal decision procedure leads to larger and more
prolonged deviations of the interest rate, in°ation and the output gap from equilib-
rium.
Our discussion of communication and strategic voting points out that none of
these results are fully convincing. In reality, monetary policy committee meetings are
dividedinto two rounds. In the ¯rst, members exchange their views of the state of the
economy and in the second, the interest rate decision is taken. Therefore, the model
should allow for communication among committee members. Moreover, the paper
ignores strategically motivated behavior. In the case of equally skilled members, this
makes nodi®erence, butifcommittee members di®er in abilities, thereexist incentives
to manipulate policy outcomes or mimic behavior in the presence of uncertainty.
Despite these speci¯c problems, we may conclude that the surveyed literature
makes a strong case for making monetary policy decisions in a committee.3
3It should be noted that there are other justi¯cations for the use of a committee that are not
related to the literature that we surveyed here. According to Sibert and Mihov (2002), committees
may lead to the appropriate degree of central bank °exibility. They argue that the desire to make
a tough impression may yield incentives for high in°ation committee members to mimic the low
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The literature on incentives for information acquisition in committees is certainly
useful for the actual design of monetary policy committees. This literature points
out that a central bank committee's decisions need not necessarily improve as the
number of committee members increases. This is due to the fact that incentives for
information acquisition are smaller when information acquisition is a public good. In
a group, individual votes are less important because the probability of being pivotal
declines.
The same reasoning applies in a setting in which communication takes place.
Although the voting rule becomes unimportant because committee members with
identical preferences agree on the collective decision as soon as all the signals are
common knowledge, incentives to acquire private signals stay the same as in the set-
ting without communication. Here "being pivotal" means contributing a signal that
changes the collective decision - not via sincere voting, but by the direct announce-
ment of the signal. It is easy to understand that both transmission mechanisms are
identical. Thus, incentives again depend on the probability to contribute the decisive
signal.
Figure 2 displays the probability that an individual decision maker casts the deci-
sive vote (contributes the decisive signal) when the probability that a signal is correct
is 0:6a n d0 :8 respectively. As one can see the probability of being pivotal declines
with the number of committee members. It is also smaller when committee members
are better informed. In a committee consisting of 21 members of which 20 are al-
in°ation ones. With large macroeconomicshocks theincentives to mimic areno longer largeenough.
The use of a committee yields better results than the use of a single policy maker who is tough. If
one believes in the need for stabilization through committees, then, Sibert and Mihov indeed provide
another nice justi¯cation for the existence of MPCs.
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signal is decisive with a probability of 11:7 percent. If committee members are bet-
ter informed and receive signals that are correct with probability 0:8, the individual
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Probability of being pivotal with n +1 committee members. The individual error
probabilities are 0:49 (dashed), 0:4 (solid), and 0:2 (dotted).
Empirical data on costs of information acquisition would be needed in order to
make any additional statements about the optimal size of an MPC. Without such
data, this issue is still left to individual judgement.
9.3 The voting rule
Another issue that is currently debated is whether MPCs should use majority or una-
nimity rule when they takepolicy decisions. The results in Feddersen and Pesendorfer
(1998, 1999a) and Persico (2000) point out that unanimity rule is not a goodstandard
for (monetary policy) committees. According to these theoretical models unanimity
rule biases statements about observed information and leads to ine±cient information
aggregation. MPCs should therefore avoid to stick to the unanimity rule.
One may object that MPC members communicate before they vote. Therefore,
one may believe that problems of insincere voting should not play a fundamental role
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naschelli, McKelvey and Palfrey (2000) shows that pre-vote communication might
only alleviate the problem of insincere voting. Therefore, it would be a wise strategy
not to make unanimity rule the standard for monetary policy decisions.
It should however be noted that the use of majority voting does not necessarily
imply that a central bank should publish its voting records. Some recent papers argue
that a culture of collective responsibility may be useful for the central bank's relation
to outside players. One can therefore well imagine a central bank that votes internally
but is collectively responsible to the outside.4
It has recently been argued that one should attach di®erent weights to the votes
of di®erent members of the ECB's council. Another conclusion that one may draw
from the theoretical analysis of communication within committees is that there is no
need to weight votes if these individuals share a common objective. When the ability
of di®erent individuals is known to the participants then weighting takes place when
individuals take their vote. There is no need to assign di®erent voting weights to
di®erent individuals.
The paper of GrÄ uner and Kiel (2003) has some additional implications for e®ective
information aggregation in MPCs where members di®er in their view about desirable
policies. In such committees extreme statements should be disregarded. Such extreme
statements should only be used if preferences of committee members are strongly
4Gersbach and Hahn (2000) show e.g. that publication of individual voting records of central
bank council members is initially harmful, since somewhat less e±cient central bankers attempt
to imitate highly e±cient central bankers in their bid to get reelected. However, after reelection,
losses will be lower when voting records are published, since the government can distinguish highly
e±cient from less e±cient central bankers more easily and can make central bankers individually
accountable. But the negative e®ects of voting transparency dominate and expected overall losses
are always larger when voting records are published.
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The literature on time consistency problems in monetary policy making has focused
on the role of policy makers preferences for the emerging in°ation rate. According
to this literature delegation to conservative policy makers is the best the government
can do in order to prevent an in°ationary bias. The literature surveyed here provides
additional insights in the role of the government's delegation decision.
Communication within the committee seems to be very useful in order to improve
the quality of the decision. Communication makes the voting rule unimportant in a
situationwhere preferences areidentical but individual signals di®er. Withcon°icting
interests the ability of a committee to communicate e±ciently is reduced. Picking a
homogenous committee may instead improve the quality of the decisions because it
facilitates internal communication.
Another conclusion that one may therefore draw is that monetary policy commit-
tees do not bene¯t from a situation where there is no common understanding of the
role and objectives of monetary policy making. This has straightforward implications
for the optimal composition of common currency areas and the central bank's mon-
etary policy committee. Heterogeneity of views of committee members is not always
bene¯cial.
9.5 Relation to the outside
There is an extensive literature on the role of the independence of the central bank
which mainly focuses on the elimination of an in°ationary bias5. The analysis of
5Faust (1996) has a model that explicitly models decision making by committees in this context.
He makes the point that there need to be a strong conservative fraction in the committee in order
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to eliminate the in°ationary bias.
ECB • Working Paper No 256 • September 2003incentives for informationacquisition in committees points out that the independence
of a committee has a di®erent e®ect which may also be quite important. Granting
a committee independence may enhance the quality of its research. Incentives for
information acquisition in the committee are higher if the committee can rely on
the fact that policy is based on its opinion only. A dependent committee has little
incentives to acquire information and is therefore less likely to acquire expertise.67
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